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INTRODUCTION

In theory, if not reality, each tribal judiciary attempts to
conscientiously serve the community that created it. This simple
proposition likely binds jurists from across the globe regardless of
race, ethnicity, or nationality. Beyond that similarity, tribal court
systems differ in structure and substance, sometimes significantly
and sometimes dramatically.

† Citizen of the Ho-Chunk Nation; Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe Solicitor
General; Ho-Chunk Nation Supreme Court Chief Justice; University of Minnesota
Law School Adjunct Professor (Indian Law, 2016–2017). Additionally, the author
has served in a judicial pro tempore capacity for eight tribes in Michigan and
Wisconsin. The author does not profess a unique personal knowledge of tribal
tradition and custom but has consistently attempted to infuse this essential law into
judicial opinions entered over the course of nearly eighteen years on the bench.
The viewpoints expressed herein represent the individual perspective of the author
and not the official position of any of the author’s employers. As an affirmation of
tribal sovereignty, the author uses each tribal court’s citation method when citing
to each sovereign’s statutes and court opinions.

743

744

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:4

A tribal judiciary may emerge through tribal legislation or,1 at
times, trace its origin to a constitutional source.2 In either instance,
a tribal court functions pursuant to law, written and unwritten.3 This
unique body of law, along with corresponding procedures,4
produces clear distinctions between tribal judiciaries. In fact, the
jurisprudential distinctions that arise may appear more pronounced
than those that exist within and between the federal and state
systems. Some commonalities emerge,5 but similarities are easily
overstated.
1. See, e.g., 5 MLBSA §§ 1–2 (2011) (identifying the legislative formation of
the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe Court of Central Jurisdiction in 1981, comprising
separate trial and appellate level tribunals that derive authority from the Band
Assembly, a successor to the monocratic Reservation Business Committee). The
Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe is a federally recognized Indian tribe and constitutes one
of six distinct sovereign bands that compose the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe. Indian
Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau
of Indian Affairs, 81 Fed. Reg. 5019, 5021 (Jan. 29, 2016). The acronym “MLBSA”
refers to Mille Lacs Band Statutes Annotated, which are accessible in current form
on the Band’s website at http://millelacsband.com/tribal-government-home
/band-statutesordinances/.
2. See, e.g., HCN CONST. art. III, § 2, http://www.ho-chunknation.com
/government/the-constitution-of-the-ho-chunk-nation.aspx (establishing a fourpart governmental structure in 1994, including the Ho-Chunk Nation Judiciary,
which technically formed in 1995 and comprises separate trial and appellate level
tribunals and a Traditional Court that consists of recognized hocąk clan and Native
American Church leaders). The Ho-Chunk Nation is a federally recognized Indian
tribe formerly known as the Wisconsin Winnebago. Indian Entities Recognized and
Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 81 Fed.
Reg. at 5021.
3. See HCN CONST. art. VII, § 5(a) (“The Trial Court shall have original
jurisdiction over all cases and controversies, both criminal and civil, in law or in
equity, arising under the Constitution, laws, customs, and traditions of the HoChunk Nation . . . .”); 5 MLBSA § 111(c) (2011) (demarcating the subject matter
jurisdiction of the Court of Central Jurisdiction, which extends to “any cause of
action that may arise from unwritten cultural law or a violation thereof”).
4. See HCN CONST. art. VII, § 7(b) (“The Supreme Court shall have the power
to establish written rules for the Judiciary . . . .”); 5 MLBSA § 105(a) (2011) (“The
Court of Central Jurisdiction shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, the
forms of process, writs, pleadings, rules of evidence and motions and the practice
and procedure of the District Court and Court of Appeals . . . .”).
5. A tribal judiciary, for example, must afford litigants the protections
afforded by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191, 195 n.6 (1978) (citing Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90824, § 202, 82 Stat. 73, 77–78 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)–(d)
(2012))) (“The Indian Civil Rights Act . . . extends to ‘any person’ within the tribe’s
jurisdiction certain enumerated guarantees of the Bill of Rights of the Federal
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Consequently, one cannot examine a few, to even several, tribal
court systems and offer a meaningful critique of tribal judiciaries in
general.6 Extrapolation of common and consistent doctrines,
principles, and theories within a single tribal system oftentimes
proves difficult due to largely unpublished or fairly inaccessible case
law.7 For this reason or others, most commentators do not typically
dedicate attention to a single tribal judiciary. Perhaps such emphasis
would not generate a sufficient audience, but an expanded survey
risks losing genuine insight and usually affords only some
rudimentary conclusions.8
That being said, every tribal court encounters core issues when
performing a judicial function. Each pursues an evolutionary arc,
whether intentional or not, during its institutional development. As
an initial matter, tribal courts primarily confront and resolve cases

Constitution.”); see also HCN CONST. art. X, § 1(a); 1 MLBSA §§ 1–11 (2010).
6. While not intended as a critical examination or comparative analysis of two
tribal judiciaries, the focus of this article will remain on the Mille Lacs Band of
Ojibwe and the Ho-Chunk Nation in order to elicit and endorse certain
fundamental premises.
7. The Ho-Chunk Nation Judiciary posts the full text of all substantive
appellate opinions entered in its twenty-one-year history on its website at
http://www.ho-chunknation.com/government/judiciary/supreme-court-opinions
.aspx (last visited Dec. 13, 2016). In contrast, the Mille Lacs Band Court of Central
Jurisdiction offers single paragraph descriptions of ten appellate decisions issued
since 1981. See Precedent Case Laws, MILLE LACS BAND OF OJIBWE,
http://millelacsband.com/tribal-government-home/tribal-courts/precedent-case
-laws/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2016). Otherwise, each court system provides open access
to its trial and appellate level case law, but the prospect of conducting timely and
meaningful research is challenging. See 1 HCC § 1.5b (2015) (“The Judiciary shall
complete a permanent record of all proceedings and decisions . . . . Absent
protective orders granted for good cause or Legislative enactments to the contrary,
these records shall be open to the public.”); 24 MLBSA §§ 2010–2011 (2012)
(requiring that “proceedings of the Court of Central Jurisdiction shall be open to
the public except in matters involving minors” and obliging the Court to “maintain
a record of all proceedings . . . , which shall include . . . the judgment”). The
acronym “HCC” refers to Ho-Chunk Code, which is accessible in current form on
the Tribe’s website at http://www.ho-chunknation.com/Ho-ChunkNationLaws
.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2016).
8. The sheer number of tribal courts poses an issue to large surveys due to the
potential for a huge amount of variation among them. Cf. Matthew L.M. Fletcher,
Indian Courts and Fundamental Fairness: Indian Courts and the Future Revisited, 84 U.
COLO. L. REV. 59, 73 n.79 (2013) (speculating that the number of tribal judicial
systems totals approximately 250 to 300).
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arising squarely under tribal,9 rather than federal,10 law. More
commonly, a tribal judiciary will tangentially address federal Indian
law issues in cases that derive from or coincide with state proceedings
subject to overarching federal prerogatives.11
In this article, the author provides a candid glimpse into the
development of a tribal jurisprudential philosophy, drawing upon
his unique experience as a tribal jurist and in-house legal counsel.
The article examines the difficulty inherent in shaping and
sustaining a tribal judiciary necessarily moored in tradition and
custom yet integrating characteristics essential to all courts of
competent jurisdiction. Part II briefly examines the doctrine of
subject matter jurisdiction, which, at its core, must serve as a
requisite to the exercise of judicial power. However, this
fundamental, extrinsic doctrine—as well as others—has
unfortunately become an amalgam of constitutional constraints and
prudential considerations. The resulting confusion that permeates
federal and state case law can easily confound a fledgling tribal
judiciary’s attempt to resort to such persuasive authority even when
seemingly called for by underlying tribal constitutional or statutory
law. Moreover, the incorporation of or reliance upon external
judicial analyses proves more problematic in a tribal setting since the
respective courts must balance competing concerns largely absent
within judicial systems of federal and state counterparts.
Part III focuses on the intersection between tribal tradition and
custom in western jurisprudence. The degree of significance due to
either common law tradition must vary depending upon the
circumstances. The author highlights two tribal cases to illustrate the
hazards of unwisely gravitating toward one tradition and seemingly
9. See, e.g., HCN CONST. art. VII, § 5(a) (“The Trial Court shall have original
jurisdiction over all cases and controversies, both criminal and civil, in law or in
equity, arising under the Constitution, laws, customs, and traditions of the HoChunk Nation.”).
10. In over twelve years on the Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Court bench, the author
presided over fewer than five cases that one would regard as raising substantial
federal Indian law issues. Similarly, in over five years as chief in-house counsel for
the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe, the author’s office has not defended a single matter
in the Court of Central Jurisdiction that one would immediately conceive of as a
federal Indian law case.
11. For example, tribal courts routinely consider and accept child protection
cases involving Indian children that first arise within the state system. See generally
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 93 Stat. 3071 (codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2012)).
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excluding the other. Tribal courts must instead cautiously traverse
the legal landscape, embracing and revitalizing sources of
indigenous law while carefully assimilating foreign law to
complement the emergence of a decidedly tribal jurisprudence.
II. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES: SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND
RELATED INQUIRIES
When traversing more familiar ground, a tribal court, as any
court, must preliminarily deduce whether it may exercise subject
matter jurisdiction over a dispute.12 The inquiry should remain
elemental, as commonly required by tribal law,13 and, therefore, may
correspond with federal and state practice. However, a tribal
judiciary must carefully scrutinize the development of external case
law in order to avoid the unwarranted incorporation of matters
beyond the scope of simply determining the presence of subject
matter jurisdiction.

12. If a case presents federal Indian law concerns, the jurisdictional inquiry
takes on a further dimension. In a civil matter sounding in contract, for instance, a
tribal court must remain ever mindful of the extent of its tribal adjudicatory
jurisdiction as acknowledged within federal common law. See Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (“Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to
exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations . . . .
A tribe may regulate . . . the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual
relationships with the tribe . . . through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or
other arrangements.” (emphasis added)). In a subsequent case the Court held that
a “tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction” could not surpass the permissible extent of tribal
regulatory jurisdiction. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997). The
Court, in dicta, later equated adjudicatory jurisdiction with subject matter
jurisdiction. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 367 n.8 (2001). But “[t]he Court’s
‘consensual relationship’ analysis under Montana resembles the Court’s Due Process
Clause analysis for purposes of personal jurisdiction.” Smith v. Salish Kootenai Coll.,
434 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006). Consequently, the federal inquiry incorporates
elements traditionally associated with both subject matter and personal jurisdiction.
Id. at 1137. The above-stated first Montana exception erects the metes and bounds
of tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction in a contractual matter, but a secondary
examination must occur to determine whether specific non-member conduct falls
within those common law parameters. See Attorney’s Process & Investigation Servs.
Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of the Miss. in Iowa, 609 F.3d 927, 934–38 (8th Cir. 2010).
The intersection of these two inquiries reveals a matter over which a tribal court
may exercise its reserved inherent authority.
13. E.g., HCN CONST. art. VII, § 5(a) (“The Trial Court shall have original
jurisdiction over all cases . . . arising under the Constitution, laws, customs, and
traditions of the Ho-Chunk Nation.”).
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To begin, no court can act outside the bounds of its established
subject matter jurisdiction.14 Essentially, a court may exercise subject
matter jurisdiction over a cause of action if constitutionally or
statutorily empowered to hear such cases in the abstract.15
“Jurisdiction of the subject-matter, is power to adjudge concerning
the general question involved, and is not dependent upon the state
of facts which may appear in a particular case, arising, or which is
claimed to have arisen, under that general question.”16
While tribal litigants can, and often do, raise subject matter
jurisdiction as an affirmative defense,17 a failure to do so should not
constitute a waiver.18 In this respect, subject matter jurisdiction
markedly differs from its corollary—personal jurisdiction. “The
concepts of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction . . . serve

14. See, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356 (1911) (reversing and
remanding with instructions that the case should be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction).
15. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (citing Steel Co. v.
Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)).
16. Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N.Y. 217, 229 (1878); see also Mills v. Commonwealth, 13
Pa. 627, 630 (1850) (“Jurisdiction in courts is the power and authority to declare
the law. The very word, in its origin, imports as much; it is derived from juris and
dico; I speak by the law.”). Generally speaking, earlier judicial decisions capably
addressed core principles, such as subject matter jurisdiction, in unambiguous,
elemental terms:
[Subject matter jurisdiction] is the right of the court to exercise judicial
power over that class of cases; not the particular case before it, but rather
the abstract power to try a case of the kind or character of the one
pending; and not whether the particular case is one that presents a cause
of action, or under the particular facts is triable before the court in
which it is pending, because of some inherent facts which exist and may
be developed during the trial.
Richardson v. Ruddy, 98 P. 842, 844 (Idaho 1908) (quoting TIMOTHY BROWN,
COMMENTARIES ON THE JURISDICTION OF COURTS § 1a (1891)).
17. See, e.g., HCN R. CIV. P. 6(A), http://www.ho-chunknation.com
/government/judiciary/judicial-rules.aspx (“The Answer shall . . . state any defenses
to the Complaint.”).
18. This jurisdictional underpinning must continue to exist at every stage of
the litigation, including throughout an appeal. See, e.g., Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d
1176, 1188 (7th Cir. 1980) (“[I]t has been the virtually universally accepted practice
of the federal courts to permit any party to challenge or, indeed, to raise sua sponte
the subject matter jurisdiction of the court at any time and at any stage of the
proceedings.”). A court should independently monitor whether subject matter
jurisdiction persists since a judicial act taken in its absence is presumptively null and
void. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006).
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different purposes, and these different purposes affect the legal
character of the two requirements.”19 More precisely, “the personal
jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual
liberty interest,” and “[b]ecause the requirement . . . represents first
of all an individual right, it can, like other such rights, be waived.”20
Although other rights, functioning as affirmative defenses, are
subject to waiver, courts have confusingly expressed or held that
successful movants have deprived the respective courts of
“jurisdiction,” in general terms.21 This characterization has
regrettably led to courts conflating subject matter jurisdiction with
immunity,22 justiciability,23 and timing defenses,24 to name a few.

19. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701
(1982).
20. Id. at 702–03.
21. In Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, the Court carefully avoided this morass
but chastised the appellants for their carelessness: “Petitioners fail to recognize the
distinction between the two concepts—speaking instead in general terms of
‘jurisdiction’—although their argument’s strength comes from conceiving of
jurisdiction only as subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 701.
22. See, e.g., E.F.W. v. St. Stephen’s Indian High Sch., 264 F.3d 1297, 1302–03
(10th Cir. 2001) (“Tribal sovereign immunity is a matter of subject matter
jurisdiction, which may be challenged by a motion to dismiss.” (citations omitted)).
But see, e.g., In re Prairie Island Dakota Sioux, 21 F.3d 302, 305 (8th Cir. 1994)
(“[S]overeign immunity is a jurisdictional consideration separate from subject
matter jurisdiction . . . .”); see also United States v. Cty. of Cook, Ill., 167 F.3d 381,
389 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[W]hat sovereign immunity means is that relief against the
[sovereign] depends on a statute; the question is not the competence of the court
to render a binding judgment, but the propriety of interpreting a given statute to
allow particular relief.”).
23. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 30. But see, e.g., Md. Waste Coal., Inc.
v. Md. Dep’t of the Env’t, 581 A.2d 60, 61 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990) (“Standing is
concerned with whether the parties have the right to bring suit. Subject matter
jurisdiction is concerned with whether the court has the power to hear a case.”).
24. See, e.g., State v. Pearson, 858 S.W.2d 879, 886 (Tenn. 1993) (“[S]ome state
courts hold that the expiration of the statute of limitations is jurisdictional and need
not be raised in a pre-trial motion.”). But see, e.g., Md. Cas. Co. v. Beleznay, 245 Wis.
390, 397 (1944) (Fowler, J., dissenting) (“In every case wherein the statement has
been made that the running of the statute [of limitation] extinguished a right it
extinguished it because and merely because the one in whose favor the statute has
run asserted his [or her] right to interpose the statute as a defense.”). See generally
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982) (comparing the timely filing
of an EEOC discrimination complaint with the statute of limitations and reasoning
that neither are prerequisites to jurisdiction, but both are subject to waiver,
estoppel, and equitable tolling).
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The United States Supreme Court, at times, has also
engendered or compounded the confusion. By 1998, in Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Environment, the Court lamented that jurisdiction
“is a word of many, too many, meanings.”25 Therefore, it sought to
restore primacy to the core concepts underlying subject matter
jurisdiction.
[As] . . . reflected in a long and venerable line of our
cases[:] “Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at
all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law,
and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to
the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the
cause.” Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868).[26] “On
every writ of error or appeal, the first and fundamental
question is that of jurisdiction, first, of this court, and then
of the court from which the record comes. This question
the court is bound to ask and answer for itself, even when
not otherwise suggested, and without respect to the
relation of the parties to it.” Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel
Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 453 (1900).[27] The requirement
that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter
“spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial power”
. . . and is “inflexible and without exception.” Mansfield, C.
& L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884).28

25. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (quoting
United States v. Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
26. The McCardle Court confronted an instance where Congress repealed the
provision upon which the plaintiff based the cause of action. Ex parte McCardle, 74
U.S. 506, 514 (1868) (“[W]hen an act of the legislature is repealed, it must be
considered, except as to transactions past and closed, as if it never existed.”). As
such, the case purportedly involved a federal question inquiry, which equates with
the Ho-Chunk Nation’s preliminary examination under article VII, section 5(a). See
supra note 13.
27. The Jones Court encountered a question of diversity jurisdiction for which
tribal courts have no analogue. This second category of federal subject matter
jurisdiction can converge with an examination of personal jurisdiction, but the two
doctrines are not coterminous.
28. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. at 94–95. But cf. Sinochem Int’l Co. v.
Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007) (allowing a court to first address
abstention concerns since a venue examination does not involve an assessment of
the merits); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577–78 (1999)
(permitting a precedential review of personal jurisdiction, especially when
considerably less onerous than a subject matter jurisdiction inquiry).
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Then, following a forceful admonition,29 the Court diverted
from the cited authority and incorporated the standing inquiry—a
component of the doctrine of justiciability—into the Court’s
examination of jurisdiction. In particular, “[the] triad of injury in
fact, causation, and redressability constitutes the core of [the] caseor-controversy requirement, and the party invoking . . . jurisdiction
bears the burden of establishing its existence.”30 So, regardless of its
motivation, the United States Supreme Court has not retained the
purity of analysis once expected of an examination of subject matter
jurisdiction. Moreover, the Court has sanctioned the preliminary,
albeit limited, consideration of defenses arguably unconnected to
subject matter jurisdiction.31
III. ROLE OF TRIBAL TRADITIONS AND CUSTOMS AND FOREIGN LAW
IN TRIBAL COURT DECISIONS
The U.S. Supreme Court’s Citizens for a Better Environment
decision should caution tribal court systems against indiscriminately
relying upon or incorporating external case law even when seeking
guidance on seemingly fundamental doctrines. Yet, despite
prudential and other considerations sometimes corrupting
supposedly incorruptible concepts, a tribal judiciary should not
simply disregard federal precedential authority developed over
centuries. This becomes even more important when tribal
constitutional drafters, legislators, and voters either choose or
sanction the inclusion of foreign concepts within the written law. A
tribal court would be unwise to ignore common law that has
furnished meaning to phrases such as “subject matter jurisdiction,”32
“personal jurisdiction,”33 “cases and controversies,”34 “cause of

29. “For a court to pronounce upon the meaning or constitutionality of a . . .
law when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court to act ultra
vires.” Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. at 101–02.
30. Id. at 103–04.
31. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
32. 2 HCC §§ 15.3d, 4a (2005); 5 MLBSA § 111 (2011).
33. 2 HCC §§ 15.4b, 5 (2005); 5 MLBSA § 113 (2011).
34. HCN CONST. art. VII, § 5(a).
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action,”35 “law and equity,”36 and “injunctive and declaratory
relief.”37
Tribal court judges and justices must observe a principal duty to
interpret the law.38 In doing so, a judge or justice should not
presumptively graft tribal tradition and custom with a foreign
concept to create a more palatable alternative.39 At times, such a
practice could yield unanticipated or nonsensical results.40 Also, the
integration of customary and statutory law better befits the legislative
process, which would enable adequate consultation, deliberation,
and reflection.41
Still, a tribal judiciary cannot forsake its constitutional or
statutory responsibility to adjudicate matters arising under tradition
35. 2 HCC § 14.3 (2005); 5 MLBSA § 111(b)–(c) (2011); 24 MLBSA § 2005
(2012).
36. HCN CONST. art. VII, §§ 5(a), 6(a); 5 MLBSA § 101 (2011).
37. HCN CONST. art. VII, § 6(a); 5 MLBSA § 111(d)(2) (2011).
38. HCN CONST. art. VII, § 4; 5 MLBSA § 104 (2011).
39. In this regard, the Mille Lacs Band Assembly has prohibited the Court of
Central Jurisdiction from the use of state law that conflicts with tribal tradition and
custom. See 24 MLBSA § 2007(a) (2012).
40. See, e.g., Topping v. HCN Grievance Review Bd., SU 09-08 (HCN S. Ct., July
1, 2010) at 10–14 (requiring observance of the traditional principle of woįgixate, i.e.,
treating everyone with respect and compassion, in conjunction with the provision
of due process and concluding that the tribal employer must “be sure that no
further accommodations were possible” before terminating an individual with a
health condition). A subsequent inability to agree upon and adhere to the Court’s
seemingly stringent standard necessitated three appeals before finalizing the
discharge from employment initiated over six years earlier. Topping v. Martin, SU
14-03 (HCN S. Ct., Jan. 16, 2015).
41. If a tribal judiciary possesses rulemaking authority, it should responsibly
endeavor to incorporate tradition and custom within its governing rules to the
extent possible. Cf. supra note 4 and accompanying text. The Ho-Chunk Nation
Supreme Court has engaged in an extended and ongoing consultation with the
Traditional Court to integrate traditional principles into proposed criminal rules.
Fellow Justices Samantha C. Skenandore and Tricia A. Zunker have principally and
ably undertaken this responsibility. One intriguing suggested component to the
rules would effectively enable an ever-evolving common law. The Supreme Court
envisions an individual who is a clan leader and Traditional Court member
accompanying tribal member criminal defendants to scheduled hearings. The
Traditional Court member could inform the Trial Court judges of the presence of
tradition and custom germane to a proceeding, if not comprehensively reflected in
the law or corresponding rule. In addition, the Traditional Court member could
serve as an invaluable resource in restoring harmony amongst the parties and within
the community. As an aside, each jurist in the Ho-Chunk Nation Supreme and Trial
Courts is a licensed attorney and enrolled Ho-Chunk tribal member.

2017]

TRIBAL JURISPRUDENTIAL PRINCIPLES

753

and custom.42 Defendants may express some wariness over pleadings
based on unwritten law, but, typically, articulations of tradition and
custom are neither surprising nor controversial.43 Rather, the tribal
common law memorialized in judicial opinion represents the
preservation of social mores and values for an enduring
community.44
On occasion, tradition and custom may complement or explain
tribal statute or rule.45 Customary defenses may also become
42. E.g., Gardner v. Littlejohn, CV 10-47 (HCN Tr. Ct., Feb. 2, 2011)
(acknowledging the traditional offense of defamation), rev’d in part on other grounds,
SU 11-02 (HCN S. Ct., Oct. 5, 2011); In re Name Change of White, CV 06-44 (HCN
Tr. Ct., Aug. 21, 2006) (permitting name change petition based upon traditional
prominence of paternal lineage); Decorah v. Whitegull, CV 02-17 (HCN Tr. Ct.,
Mar. 1, 2002) (recognizing traditional authority of family matriarch to condition
entry to household, thereby giving rise to a trespass action); Ho-Chunk Nation v.
Olsen, CV 99-81 (HCN Tr. Ct., Sept. 18, 2000) (identifying customary contract
principles); Whiteagle-Fintak v. Fintak, DV 99-01 (HCN Tr. Ct., Sept. 8, 1999)
(identifying traditional abhorrence of domestic abuse); Mike v. Mike, CV 99-31
(HCN Tr. Ct., July 23, 1999) (identifying traditional abhorrence of elder abuse); cf.
HCN Hous. Auth. v. Cont’l Flooring Co., CV 01-76 (HCN Tr. Ct., Feb. 19, 2002)
(refusing tribal invitation to elevate traditional contract principles over existing
written agreement between the parties); Arnett v. HCN Dep’t of Admin., CV 00-60,
65 (HCN Tr. Ct., Jan. 8, 2001) (confirming the absence of a traditional concept of
promissory estoppel), appeal denied, SU 01-01 (HCN S. Ct., Feb. 01, 2001). The two
earliest cases cited above precipitated the passage of corresponding statutes: Mike v.
Mike precipitated the passage of the Elder Protection Act of 2001, 4 HCC § 1, and
Whiteagle-Fintak v. Fintak triggered the adoption of the Domestic Abuse Act of 2000,
4 HCC § 5.
43. The preceding six Ho-Chunk cases constitute the only instances since 1995
in which tradition and custom served as an independent basis for the exercise of
subject matter jurisdiction. An exact number of Mille Lacs Band cases remains
unknown due to reasons cited above, supra note 7 and accompanying text, but is
likely comparable or fewer since plaintiffs may identify federal and state law causes
of action if no relevant Band statute exists. See 24 MLBSA § 2007(a) (2012). That
aside, Ojibwe tradition and custom are expected to guide every judicial proceeding.
The traditional concept of sha WA ni ma must inform the adjudication of all matters.
In particular, “the laws of the Band shall be construed to balance the rights of the
individual with the need to continue to co-exist in peace and harmony with one
another. In this way, order will be preserved and justice shall be accorded to each
person.” 24 MLBSA § 2003.
44. In a similar manner, within the English courts of law, “traditions and
customs . . . formed the substance of the common law.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 735 (1999).
45. See, e.g., Garcia v. Greendeer-Lee, SU 03-01 (HCN S. Ct., Apr. 30, 2003)
(Hunter, C.J., concurring) (explaining foundation of Wąkšik Wošgą traditional leave
policy appearing in the former Personnel Policies & Procedures Manual); In the
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available in certain contexts.46 However, tradition and custom does
not usually pervade tribal case law for various reasons, including, but
not limited to, (1) inconsonant constitutional or statutory law, (2)
unknowledgeable or uncertain jurists and litigants, (3) inadequate
expert referral systems, and (4) unfortunate loss of tribal heritage
and language.47
Interest of the Minor Child: K.E.F., SU 97-03 (HCN S. Ct., Oct. 17, 1997)
(comparing the customary opportunity to be heard with analogous due process
requirement); Dobbs v. Stacy, CS 07-57 (HCN Tr. Ct., June 18, 2009) (regarding
role of traditional spokesperson as referenced in the Rules for Admission to
Practice); White Eagle v. Ho-Chunk Casino, CV 04-97 (HCN Tr. Ct., July 14, 2005)
(construing the Employment Relation Act’s Unpaid Leave of Absence policy to
require leave approval when undertaking a traditional duty of care for one’s ailing
father-in-law); In the Interest of C.A.D., CV 98-38 (HCN Tr. Ct., Apr. 15, 2002)
(detailing familial and clan customary responsibility for incompetent members
when interpreting provisions in the former Hocąk Nation Children and Family
Code).
46. See, e.g., Brown v. Webster, SU 06-03 (HCN S. Ct., Feb. 9, 2007)
(establishing that an individual could not traditionally pursue personal interest to
the detriment of the tribe); Gardner, CV 10-47 (recognizing warrior’s privilege,
which affords absolute immunity to combat veterans in relation to public
statements); In re Effected Elder, DV 09-01 (HCN Tr. Ct., July 9, 2009) (verifying
the customary existence of grandparent visitation rights); Mudd v. HCN Legislature,
CV 03-01 (HCN Tr. Ct., Feb. 13, 2003) (conferring standing upon combat veterans
and family patriarch to assert interests of the tribe and female relatives,
respectively), rev’d on other grounds, SU 03-02 (HCN S. Ct., Apr. 8, 2003).
47. The foregoing reasons may jointly contribute to a dearth of tribal
jurisprudence with specific reference to tradition and custom. The Ho-Chunk
Nation Judiciary is truly fortunate to include the Traditional Court, and while the
judges, justices, and litigants may freely confer with this revered tribunal, the
referenced cases herein represent the entire canon of traditional jurisprudence. See
HCN R. CIV. P. 8(B) (“Upon a motion of the Court or by the party, the Trial Court
may request assistance from the Traditional Court on matters relating to custom
and tradition of the Nation . . . .”). The cited case law does not contain those matters
independently resolved by the Traditional Court, where a formal written decision is
not issued. HCN R. CIV. P. 8(A) (“[A] party may request to appear before the
Traditional Court on matters related to tradition and custom . . . , [and] must
voluntarily consent . . . to be bound by its decision.”). A single instance, however,
exists where the Traditional Court accepted transfer of a case initiated in the Trial
Court, because the proceeding involved a unique matter sounding entirely in
tradition and custom. A Ho-Chunk veteran had passed away, and an unknowing
funeral director conferred the United States flag for burial upon a surviving sister.
Subsequently, the deceased’s adult son, also a veteran, demanded possession of the
flag. The Traditional Court undertook to resolve the matter, which proved to be of
fundamental importance within the Ho-Chunk warrior society. In accordance with
procedural rule, the Trial Court issued an abridged judgment, omitting any
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Yet, even if tradition and custom do not appear on the face of a
judgment, they likely aided in reaching the judgment. Litigants
almost always encounter an atmosphere in tribal court that proves
more conducive than state and federal courts to fostering
compassion and understanding, if not unanimity.48 A tribal court will
generally afford a party significant latitude to express his or her
position, even if for cathartic effect alone. That being said, a tribal
judge or justice should not dispense with procedural and substantive
requisites under the guise of such laudable purposes. An ostensible
observation of tradition and custom must not become shorthand for
judicial laziness.
Quite simply, the task of a tribal judge or justice is a daunting
one. Most tribal judiciaries do not claim a lengthy pedigree, and, as
expected, tribal jurists must resolve many issues of first impression.
These jurists must typically attempt to dispense justice within close
proximity of political influence given the relatively small population
of tribes.49 Furthermore, tribal court systems must operate with
diminished resources, financial and otherwise, and perhaps a
compromised ability to research tribal case precedent. Even further,
many tribal courts rely on lay judges, who oftentimes perform an
admirable job but must tackle the issues identified in this article,
among others, with sometimes little internal assistance or external
support.
Against this backdrop, a tribal judiciary must contend with the
inherent tension that comes from sustaining tradition and custom
reference to particular tradition and custom. Percy v. Swan, CV 96-28 (HCN Tr. Ct.,
Apr. 2, 1998); see also HCN R. CIV. P. 70 (“All decisions of the Traditional Court will
be summarized in writing by the Trial Court Judge.”). Given a history of exploitive
interaction with cultural anthropologists, the Traditional Court has remained
reluctant to divulge tradition and custom that pertains to interpersonal and clanrelated duties.
48. See 24 MLBSA § 2002 (“The judicial philosophy of the Non-Removable
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians is a product of . . . our customs of life since
time immemorial . . . . [P]roceedings in the Court of Central Jurisdiction shall not
be adversarial but shall be a search for truth and justice.”); HCN JUD. R. ETHICS, § 41(C) (2015), http://www.ho-chunknation.com/media/35131/hcn_r__judicial
_ethics__12-4-15_.pdf (“A tribal court judge or justice should give to every person
who is legally interested in a proceeding . . . a full right to be heard according to
tribal law and tradition.”).
49. For example, the Ho-Chunk Nation declared an August 1, 2016,
population of 7684 enrolled members. HCN LEG. RES. 07-06-16D,
http://ho-chunknation.com/media/234312/07.06.16d_per_capita_declaration
_for_august_1__2016.pdf
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while incorporating external jurisprudential principles when
appropriate. A tribal court will unnecessarily struggle if it selects to
adopt a single methodology when a syncretic approach should
predominate. Tribal courts should eschew a wholesale adoption of
foreign case law seemingly done for purposes of expediency.50
Similarly, tribal courts must exercise care when interpreting
established legal doctrine through the lens of tradition and custom.
The two case summaries below illustrate the pitfalls associated with
either practice.
Each appellate court encountered issues of first impression and,
more than likely, internally grappled with determining the most
fitting approach to the respective controversies. Both factual
scenarios required the courts to address a single tribal member’s
alleged betrayal or disruption of tribal societal norms. Each tribal
member resorted to the Indian Civil Rights Act,51 and corresponding
tribal law, in defense of their actions. The similarities then fall away,
demonstrating, yet again, the inherent difficulty of offering
generalizations in an academic discussion of tribal courts.
In the first case, the elected leadership of the Ho-Chunk Nation
sought to transform a bingo facility in Madison, Wisconsin, into a
full-fledged casino, which the tribe had reserved as a possibility
within its 1992 gaming compact with the state.52 The City of Madison
set the matter for a nonbinding referendum scheduled for February
17, 2004, but former Governor James E. Doyle indicated he would
accept the results as dispositive. In the midst of the referendum
campaign, Ho-Chunk tribal member and supervisory gaming
employee Daniel M. Brown, acting in his individual capacity,
provided interviews after business hours to the local media,
remarking that the Ho-Chunk Nation promoted discriminatory

50. At this juncture, most tribal jurists join established judicial systems and have
not had an opportunity to participate in the formation of a given judiciary. Multiple
reasons counsel against tribes perfunctorily adopting the judicial model of the
oppressor, but valid arguments also exist for creating parallel or analogous
governmental structures. These important issues remain outside the purview of this
article.
51. “Although the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA) makes a handful of
analogous safeguards enforceable in tribal courts . . . ‘the guarantees are not
identical’ [to the Bill of Rights] . . . .” Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384–85 (2001)
(Souter, J., concurring) (citations omitted). But see supra note 5 and accompanying
text.
52. Brown v. Webster, SU 06-03 (HCN S. Ct., Feb. 9, 2007).
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employment practices.53 Whether these interviews impacted the
referendum remains unknown, but Madison residents rejected the
casino proposal.
Nonetheless, the Nation’s Executive Director of Business
terminated Mr. Brown in May 2004, in large part because of Mr.
Brown’s public statements. The trial court subsequently overturned
the termination due to a clear violation of Mr. Brown’s freedom of
speech. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the trial level
judgment, beginning with the sentiment expressed below:
Assuming arguendo that the free speech claim was a part of
the complaint, it is a case of first impression. The HoChunk Nation Court system is not required to fully adopt
the precedents established by the United States Supreme
Court as to the United States Constitution. Rather, the HoChunk Nation Court system must rely on the Nation’s laws
and perhaps, the Nation’s common law or tribal law.54
Then, despite neither party raising the matter at trial,55 the
Supreme Court pronounced it would “view the conduct of Mr.
Brown as violative of the concept Wogixate, which is a value that could
be defined as respect.”56 The Supreme Court had never employed
this traditional concept before, and its amorphous quality enabled
wide-ranging effect.57 In this case, woįgixate yielded the following
consequence:
According to tradition, it is not the Ho-Chunk way for an
individual who is part of this community to independently
take action without being respectful to the Tribe and its
53. On this point, Mr. Brown misperceived the Nation’s employment policies
relating to Indian and Ho-Chunk preference, regarding such practices as racially
discriminatory as opposed to the legitimate aims of a sovereign tribal government.
See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974); see also 6 HCC § 5.5b
(codifying Indian preference provisions).
54. Brown, SU 06-03 at 3.
55. In an earlier case, the Supreme Court refrained from addressing an issue
on appeal that the trial judge had no opportunity to consider below. Mudd v. HCN
Legislature, SU 03-02 (HCN S. Ct., Apr. 8, 2003) at 5 n.1; see also Campbell v. Davol,
Inc., 620 F.3d 887, 891 (8th Cir. 2010) (“It is old and well-settled law that issues not
raised in the trial court cannot be considered by this court as a basis for reversal.”
(quotation and citation omitted)).
56. Brown, SU 06-03 at 5.
57. Cf. supra text accompanying note 40 (referring to a case in which the court
analogized woįgixate with compassion to hold that an employer did not take
sufficient steps to accommodate a disabled employee before terminating the
employee).
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leaders. For an individual to conduct themselves in such a
manner in the past would have resulted in banishment.
Here, for his conduct as demonstrated by the record, Mr.
Brown suffered the loss of his employment, which is a
significant punishment.58
More specifically, “[t]he action of Mr. Brown in contacting the
media constitute[d] an action motivated for his individual desires
. . . . There is no need to determine whether the words and conduct
of Dan Brown were protected, when his conduct ran so counter to
those standards accepted by this tribal community.”59
The Ho-Chunk Nation Supreme Court, therefore, avoided
determining the degree of protection afforded by the constitutional
Free Speech Clause.60 The Court’s willingness to equate a sincere,
albeit misguided, criticism of a tribal employment practice with a
significant affront to the tribal community allowed it to characterize
the case in a different manner. The Supreme Court also drew a
direct parallel between the traditional leadership and popularly
elected executive and legislative representatives without any
surrounding discussion. Ultimately, a distinct prospect exists that
one’s freedom of speech must succumb to the expressed will of tribal
government, which proves highly problematic.61
In contrast, the second highlighted case involves a court actually
considering the legitimacy of banishment or, at least, its
contemporary equivalent—exclusion. In 2008, the Mille Lacs Band
of Ojibwe promulgated an exclusion ordinance in response to
increased criminality and violence on the reservation, especially as
perpetrated by several emerging gangs.62 Darrick D. Williams Jr. was
the sixth individual against whom the Band had filed an exclusion
petition. The matter proceeded to the Mille Lacs Band Court of

58. Brown, SU 06-03 at 5–6.
59. Id. at 6.
60. “The Ho-Chunk Nation, in exercising its powers of self-government, shall
not: (1) make or enforce any law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” HCN
CONST. art. X, § 1(a)(1).
61. Tellingly, Daniel M. Brown won elected tribal legislative office less than
four months after issuance of the appellate judgment. Ho-Chunk Nation Election
Results, HOCĄK WORAK, June 13, 2007, at 1. Thereafter, the Ho-Chunk Nation
Legislature voted overwhelmingly to designate Mr. Brown as tribal Vice President.
Legislature, HOCĄK WORAK, Aug. 22, 2007, at 13 (quoting HCN LEG. MINS. (July 5,
2007)).
62. See Band Governmental Power and Sovereignty, 2 MLBSA §§ 3001–3013.
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Appeals on an interlocutory appeal, meaning that the trial court had
not issued final findings of fact.63
As a result, similar to Brown, the court of appeals avoided
addressing the central issue. Instead, after acknowledging that it
“ha[d] never addressed the issue of when a party may mount a facial
challenge to a Band ordinance,”64 the court of appeals found that
the exclusion ordinance could implicate fundamental rights.65 For
instance, the court noted that Mr. Williams “expressed a desire to
learn and practice the cultural and spiritual ways of the Anishinabe”
at oral argument,66 thereby effectively raising a free exercise claim
and justifying a facial attack.67
After the court established these predicates, it proceeded to
closely scrutinize the exclusion ordinance before rendering it
ineffectual. The opinion examines federal case law addressing the
identified subject areas and then superimposes this law onto Band
statute.68 Yet, the governing statutory law actually obliges the
presiding justices to interpret an ordinance by “consider[ing] and
weigh[ing] unwritten cultural law, historical tribal legal opinions,
and precedents of the Court of Central Jurisdiction.”69
Unfortunately, the court of appeals seemingly bypassed this
instruction and permitted a single individual to facially attack a law
that tried to resurrect a customary practice of the tribe.70
63. Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe Indians v. Williams, 11-APP-06, 1–2 (MLB App.
Ct., Jan. 18, 2012). See generally Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. 452 (1973).
64. Williams, 11-APP-06 at 2.
65. Id. at 5.
66. Id. at 3.
67. “The Band Assembly for the Non-Removable Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
Indians in exercising the powers of self-government shall make no law which
prohibits the free exercise of religion . . . .” 1 MLBSA § 1(a) (2010). Both Brown and
Williams raise constitutional concerns that should prompt an analysis of federal First
Amendment jurisprudence, but each also raises questions about the application of
tradition and custom. In Brown, the appellee could not elevate the exercise of his
individual freedom over the common welfare of the tribe. Conversely, in Williams,
the appellant not only could assert his individual rights, but also the rights of
similarly situated individuals, at potential risk to the tribe. The cases demonstrate
the inevitable tension that tribal judges and justices must try to alleviate.
68. See Williams, 11-APP-06 at 8.
69. 24 MLBSA § 2008 (2012).
70. Had the court of appeals rejected the facial challenge, it would have likely
remanded the matter to the district court for purposes of deducing facts in
connection with a surviving as-applied challenge. Currently, Darrick D. Williams Jr.
is incarcerated at the Federal Transfer Center in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Mr.
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Neither of the above-discussed cases presented an easy legal or
factual scenario. Accordingly, each warranted thoughtful and
deliberate consideration, which likely occurred, but other influences
may have prevented a more comprehensive examination. Tribal law
often demands more than a primary, secondary, or even tertiary
analysis.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, tribal litigants will often assert various claims and
defenses with lengthy and complicated pedigrees. A tribal judiciary
must consequently endeavor to parse the ever-evolving
jurisprudence—federal, state, and tribal—to discern fundamental
concepts, doctrines, and principles. Each court must then correctly
apply these standards and tenets within appropriate contexts lest it
struggle with an inconsistent and tortured case history. Finally,
tradition and custom can inform and transform each foreign
concept if revealed by a court or the parties,71 and if it proves
relevant to the matter at issue.

Williams pled guilty on May 8, 2012, to RICO conspiracy. He received a sentence of
nine years, eight months, and his projected release date is July 9, 2020. United States
v. Williams, 12-CR-026, at 1–2 (D. Minn. May 30, 2013) (sentencing judgment); see
Andy Mannix, Native Mob Gang Members Plead to Lesser Charges in Federal Case, CITY
PAGES (May 31, 2012), http://www.citypages.com/news/native-mob-gang-members
-plead-to-lesser-charges-in-federal-case-6541926.
71. On the one hand, a tribal court must endeavor to enunciate and proliferate
tribal tradition and custom. Supra note 3; see also HCN JUD. R. ETHICS, § 4-1(C)
(2015) (“A judge or justice may . . . obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on
federal law, tribal law, custom or tradition or on other sources of law applicable to
a proceeding . . . .”); MLB JUD. CANONS, § 3(B)(7)(b) (2013), http://millelacsband
.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Judicial-Canons-Court-Order-51.pdf
(“A
judge may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on federal law, state law, other
sources of law, or tribal law, custom or tradition if the advice is applicable to a
proceeding . . . .”). On the other hand, although a judge or justice must apply
tradition and custom when appropriate, he or she must also remain an objective,
neutral arbiter who cannot unduly advocate for any party. HCN JUD. R. ETHICS, § 41(D) (2015) (“A tribal court judge or justice should not assume an advocate role.”);
MLB JUD. CANONS, § 3(B)(5) (2013) (“A judge shall perform judicial duties without
bias or prejudice.”).
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